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1DEISM AS PRESENTED IN TINDiL'S "CHRISTIANITY AS OLD AS CREATION."
Chapter I
Why Deism Arose.
The eighteenth century in English thought has "been charac-
terized hy many writers as a period "in which imagination slept,
and in which the sense of the temporal realities of life was
strong. It was a period of criticism rather than of creation.
In the field of religion this critical attitude displayed it-
self in an attempt to substitute for divine revelation, chiefly
as recorded in the Bible, a more dependable instrument for dis-
covering God and the laws of righteousness. Reason, conceived
as a natural faculty of man, was declared to be the meams by
which the true religion could be found. Revealed religion, it
was contended, must give way to natural religion.
The causes for the appearance at this time of a large
group of thinkers who were radically opposed to revealed religion
are not difficult to find. In the first place, the great astro-
nomical discoveries of the two preceding centuries disclosed a
universe much more extensive and differently organized than had
been reported by the Biblical account. Copernicus had adequately
1. Moody and Lovett. History of English Literature , page 19©.

demonstrated that this earth was not the center of the tmiverse,
and that the earth revolved around the sim, not the sun around
the earth. Revelation seemed to have erred on these points
•
Secondly, there came at this time a long procession of travelers
who told wonderful tales about other lands and other seas, and
about carious peoples with curious beliefs, whose religions -
said there were many - differed from the Christian revelation in
many essential points. And thirdly, the number of thinkers
whose intellectual interests caused them to seek mathematical
certainty in matters of religion as well as in astronomy and
physics greatly increased as the possibilities of exact knowledge
in these fields became more and more evident. Revelation, alas,
offered no such certainty. The followers of revealed religion
were divided into many sects, each of which branded all others
as false. Christianity, based upon revelation, was losing its
oogency because of the conflict within its own ranks. And this
is the fourth reason why there was an outcry for a new prop, for
a criterion of religious knowledge which, by bringing certainty
of the kind that the new growing sciences offered, would do
away with the speculative differences within the Christian church.
"Reason" presented itself as the instrument by which a recon-
ciliation between the new world view and orthodox Christianity
could be attained, an instrument which could satisfy the in-
tellectual thirst, and could bring peace into the warring relig-
ious camps. All people seemed to have this inborn faculty, it
seemed to be natural to man. And the attempt was accordingly
made to substitute natural religion, a religion based upon
reason, for Christianity. This attempt is known as deism.

3The "Bible" of deism was presented by Matthew Tindal
under the title, Christianity As Old As Creation. In the
next chapter we shall consider the doctrine of deism as it is
presented in this book, and the following chapters will be de-
voted to a criticism of this doctrine.

Chapter II
The "Bible" of Deism
Matthew Tindal, an English churchman and a student of
church law, was the son of a clergyman, and had been trained in
the doctrine of the English church in a strictly orthodox manner.
But after he had studied at Oxford and had become a fellow in
that xmiversity, it dawned upon him that the separation from the
church of Rome was not defensible; and as a result of this
change of heart he entered the Catholic church« He had not been
within its doors for a very long time, however, when he began
to revolt against the absurdities of popery. He left the church
of Rome and began an active campaign against the tyrrany and
superstition of Catholicism. Finally he extended his attack to
2
revealed religion in general. Christianity As Old As Creation,
which came from his pen in 1730, presents by statement aad im-
plication the leading tenets of deism, the doctrine to which his
revolt led him. Let us turn our attention, then, to the pages
of this book.
The basic principle of deism is that reason is our sole
and sufficient guide in life. Thru reason God and the ways of
Sod can be discovered and explained. Thru reason, also, we can
2. Tindel wrote a second volume of Christianity As Old Af
Creation . It had not been printed when his death occurred,
and Bishop Gibson, into whose hands the Ms. , fell destroyed
it.

5discover wliat constitutes right conduct. The rational end of
all human action is undoubtedly happiness, "but happiness secured
only through doing the will of God. How, the will of God can
he ascertained hy observing the natural relations which exist
between things, "The end for which God has given us reason, is
to compare things, and the relation they stand in to each other;
and from thence to judge of the fitness and unfitness of actions."^
And if we observe nature what relations between things do we
find? We find that the phenomena of nature are beautiful and
harmonious, for "God acts in constant conformity to the
reason and nature of things, and »tis a contradiction to his
nature for him to do anything that is not fit and reasonable."^
And what kind of a lawgiver does reason discover back of
this harmonious universe? Obviously, God must be infinite and ;
perfect, for this is a perfect world, and, therefore, presupposes
a perfect creator. He is infinite in all possible directions,
infinitely good, infinitely wise, just, and powerful. But the
deist does not stop here. Since God is perfect in wisdom,
strength, and goodness, he must be perfectly happy also. "'Tis
God alone, who has an unlimited reason and happiness." Further- ,
more, God is immatable. And why should he change? Is he not
perfectly happy? And who changes if it is not for the sole
purpose of being more happy?
3. Christianity As Old As Creation , page 26.
4. Same.
5. Same, page 24.

6It is obvious that an all-powerful and perfectly happy-
God is not at all disturbed "by the petty affairs in this world.
We, hy our conduct, can neither sadden nor gladden him. But if
this is the case the (juestion at once arises. Why should we "be
moral? Tindal anticipated this question and he has a ready
reply. Concerning conduct with reference to self he advises
that we should do our best to preserve good health, strong men-
tality and general good cheer. Do not commit sins on your ovm
body, because "all unfriendly affections carry their own torment
with them, and endless inconveniences attend the excess of
sensual delights."^ In other words, one should live a healthy
life in order to avoid pain and the doctor's bills. And now
another phase of the question of conduct is considered. How
should the individual act toward his neighbors, morally or im-
morally? Either procedure can make no particle of difference to
God. However, according to Tindal, one's conduct in society
malces a great deal of difference to the individual, himself. And
as a rule, "..it is his (man's) duty to deal with them (his
neighbors) as he expects they should deal with him."' At the
first glance this shines like the golden rule; but its splendor
fades as we review his reasons for such conduct. If you do not
treat others fairly they will not treat you fairly. If you
break the rules of neighborly conduct you will be treated as a
common enemy, and you will experience all the inconveniences that
being an enemy implies. Of these facts Tindal carefully reminds
you.
6. Christianity As Old As Creation, pages 16-17.
7. Same.

7But the promotion of one's own good is not the only motive
for moral conduct, according to Tindal's view. God "can't but
expect his rational creatures should act according to their
natures", for "God has endowed man with such a nature" and "t'is
the will of God" that we should live according to the nature he
has implanted in us. To disobey our natures would be to thwart
God's purpose; to obey our natures would be acting morally. But
man's nature forces him to seek his own good. Hence, to desire
one's own good is to be moral; and we should be moral, for "'tis
the will of God," and, therefore, a duty.® It would seem, then,
that both love for self and respect for God's law are reasons
for being moral.
And what bearing has deism, as Tindal has stated it, upon
Christianity? Tindal asserted that it magnifies the worth of
Christianity. The argument which he presented, however, leads
to a very different conclusion. He points out that whatever in
the Bible is reasonable and expedient has always been approved
by "right reason," the rest is unreasonable and superstitious,
and hence is not a part of true Christianity. Therefore, true
Christianity is as old as creation. It did not begin with the
coming of Christ.
The significance of this attitude toward Christian revel-
ation may be best stated in the form of a dilemma, the material
for which Tindal himself furnishes us. Christian revelation
mast teach either the same as reason, or it must add to or sub-
tract from the teaching of reason. And whichever one of these
8. Christianity As Old As Creation, page 18.

8functions it performs it is to "be oondenmed. For if revelation
teaches the same as reason it is superfluous, and a wise God,
therefore, would not send it; if it adds to the teachings of
reason it is unintelligible, for what is above and beyond reason
is xmintelligible ; and if it subtracts from reason then it is to
be branded as false. It was on the first horn of this dilemma
that Tindal allowed the Christian revelation to be caught. In
chapter seven of his book he clearly points out that reason and
revelation must teach the same law, for, as he says at the open-
ing of the chapter, "Natural and revealed religion having the same
end, their precepts must be the same." But the conclusion, namely
that Christianity is superfluous, and, therefore, not a God-given
revelation, he left for his readers to draw for themselves.
To the end, then, Tindal pretends to be applauding the
Christian doctrine; but with reference to the ceremonies which
hover around that doctrine he spoke with full sincerity and honesty
Of course, a deist, the champion of reason, should discard every-
thing that lacks a rational foundation. Hence Tindal concludes
that there should be no divine service distinct from the duties
of man to man. Since God is perfectly happy and immutable our
services can never alter his position; and it is, accordingly,
only for our happiness and the happiness of our fellows that he
requires of us any activities whatsoever. Towards the close of
chapter eleven Tindal asks, in effect, "And nov/ do you not
think that we may justly conclude that whatsoever God requires of
us to believe or practice is purely for our good; and, conse-
quently, that no belief or practice which does not contribute

9to that good oan come from God; and. that, therefore, as long
as we adhere to what reason reveals to us concerning the good-
ness of God, by admitting everything into religion which makes
for the good maa, and nothing that does not. we can not mistake
our duty either to God or man?"^
Tindal is especially hitter in his attitude toward the
complexity and pomp of the Catholic ritual, and he. therefore,
delights in unmasking the absurdities and superstitions of Cath-
olicism. "What reason." he asks, "has a Papist, for instance,
to laugh at an Indian who thinks it contributes to his future
ha-DTDiness to die with a cow's tail in his hands, while he (the
10
Papist) lays as great a stress on rubbing a dying man with oil.'
In short, Tindal reconmiends the abolition of sacrifices,
fasting, and penance; the abolition of all forms of worship that
do not promote human welfare. Even prayer is vain. Should we,
therefore, give up prayer, too? a?hat seemed to him to be going
too far. And he searched about to find an excuse for praying.
His excuse, to put it in present-day terms, is the psychological
value of prayer, its effect upon the mind and character of the
one offering the prayer. Worship to God should be expedient
to man, no other form of worship is necessary, reasonable, or
true - this is his final word on the subject.
So far we have aimed to present the deistic platform
and some of its implications as they can be gathered from an
examination of Tindal' s Christianity As_ oy As_ C_re£bion ^ That
the doctrine is weak is apparent even to a casual reader.
It
9. Christianity As Old As Creation , page 177.
10. Same, page 127.
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champions a shallow optimism. It loolcs upon this universe as
made up wholly of advantageous adaptations and "beautiful har-
monies; everything, it asserts, is good. It sets up a God v/ho is
perfect in all possible ways, a God that is rolling in happiness,
a God who is not at all disturbed by the many problems and puzzle
that fill the lives of the creatures he has created. But how
a God thus removed from the needs and interests of finite beings
can be an object of worship deism fails to make clear. Finally
this God who has unlimited happiness, deism says, bids his
creatures seek happiness, He bids every man to seek his own
good. He transforms even the golden rule into a precept for
personal good. But whether morality can thus be identified with
pure expediency is a question which demands more serious con-
sideration than Tindal gives it.
We shall take up a more extended criticism of deism from
the modern point of view in Chapter IV. Let us now leave
Christianity As Old As Creation, and turn to a study of some of
the contemporary critics of Tindal and his book.
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Chapter III
Contemporary Critioism.
Tindal succeeded in stirring up a number of religious
thinkers of his time. His book called out a torrent of replies,
because, perhaps, its implied conclusion that Christian revela-
tion, had it been made, would have been superfluous, and hence it
is not reasonable to think that it was made, was not pleasing.
Weak points in his premises were searched for, and some of them
were found. It will be sufficient for our purpose to consider
four of the most representative critics of this book, James
Foster, John Conybeare, John Leland, and William Law.
James Foster believed in independent thinking and free
discussion in all religious subjects. He accepted one of Tin-
dal »s fundamental propositions, namely, that reason is, indeed,
a valuable faculty. He was willing to grant that reason played
an important part in religious life as well as elsewhere; but
that there was, therefore, no room on the stage for revelation
he staunchly denied. Tindal had said that all men have the
faculty, reason, and that the deliverances of this faculty are
the same for all men. The absurdity of this assertion Foster
makes very clear. "Let any one of common observation and
knowledge of the world give himself a little time to consider,
and he will find that men have not only vastly different capac-
ities for discovering the obligations of true religion and

morality in their utmost extent, but that their opportunities
and advantages are very different. Some not only enjoy greater
strength of reason, hut are much more likely, if their faculties
were but equal, considering the circumstances in which they are
placed, to form right notions about these important points than
others. And if the rectitude of human nature consists in the
practice of virtue; do not such enjoy better meajas and more favor-
able opportunities for pursuing their supreme rational
perfection
and happiness than those whose knowledge, and consequently
their
practice, of natural religion and morality is corrupted and de-
praved by false and dishonorable notions of God, and by a low
and extravagant superstition?""^^
Poster, then, admits that for some the power of reason
may be a sufficient guide, so far as a knowledge of God and
morality is concerned; but for majiy reason is surely an inade-
quate guide. And since God gave to some only the power to
reason, may he not also have given to others revelation? And
is not revelation indeed necessary, for do we not neglect
to
perform many of the dictates of reason? And since even those
who have been blessed with reason neglect to follow its
dictates,
is it not reasonable to think that they also should be
favored
with revelation?
This question is raised by his defense of revelation.
Why did not God give an adequate reasoning power to all?
Foster
meets thia question with the reply, not uncommon to the
opponents
of deism, that we cannot fathom the depths of
God^s intentions
11. Foster, The Usefulness, Trjith, and Exoellencj. of ^le
Chris-
tian Revelation . London, 1731, page 74.
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and ways; the ways of God to man are incomprehensilDle.
Poster's contention, then, was that not all have an ade-
quate reasoning power, John Conybeare, the next critic whom we
shall consider, went a step further. He questioned the efficacy
of reason even in those that have it in its highest form, Vfliy,
said he, even the most logical and deepest thinkers have not
"been able to exhaust any field in science, morals, and religion.
Man*s reason shrinks to insignificance when placed against the
depths and intricacies of these subjects. What mortal has yet
discovered the ultimate truths of man's world, being, and con-
duct? Conybeare truthfully says, "In reference to God though
something may be loiown, yet it must be confessed that maay things
are secret to us. In reference to ourselves how many diffi-
culties may be started even about our own persons of which we
can give no tolerable solutions? And if we are so much strangers
to our own personal condition, how much less can we determine
with certainty as to things which relate to others? Little do
we know concerning the nature and powers of visible beings; and
12
Still much less concerning these which are invisible. "•^'^ And
it is, therefore, to accomplish all this that reason fails to
accomplish that revelation has been sent to us.
At this juncture Conybeare seems to anticipate the question.
What truths does the gospel reveal that reason does not reveal?
He sees, apparently, that he cannot answer it squarely, for he
suddenly turns to another point. Revelation, he argues, is more
practical, for its sanctions are clearer, its laws have stronger
IE. Conybeare, Defense of Revealed Religion. London, 1732, p. 294.
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authority, its mode of teaching is more effective. If we were
guided in our conduct merely by what reason discloses as to the
"fitness of things," as Tindal proposed, then we would do things
merely because we wished to do them. And if we chose not to
act, then we would be at liberty to refrain from acting. Hence
it seems necessary that God should prescribe our duties in the
more authoritative form of revelation,
HMt is it fair for God to prescribe ceremonies and rituals
without giving reasons for them? Conybeare answers, "Do we not
find earthly kings doing the same thing?" To draw an analogy
between an earthly king and an all-perfect God in order to
justify the ways of God shows the weakness and grotesqueness of
the whole controversy.
It remains, however, for John Leland to win the prize for
the greatest display of contradiction, questionable assumptions,
and false analogies. Tindal had argued that since God is un-
changeable He could prescribe no nev/ injunctions by means of a
revelation. To which Leland replies, "God may see fit for ex-
cellent ends to lay new injunctions upon men, or make some
further discoveries of his will, suited to that alteration of
circumstances. Uor would this show that he was changeable, but
that he was most wise and good." How an all-powerful being
can make new prescriptions, thus changing his mind and will,
and yet remain unchangeable it is difficult to understand. A-
gain, Tindal had argued that God does not at any time or under
any circumstances prescribe positive precepts which have no
reason for being prescribed, and, therefore, the many forms of
religious ceremonies prescribed by the ritual of the church,
*See note 13, pag-e 15.
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which are "unreasonable and inexpedient, were not prescribed by-
God. Leland entirely misses the point of the argtunent, and
replies, "....it would be the most unreasonable thing in the
world to pretend that he (God) cannot institute or appoint what
are the properest outward rites or manner of performing that wor-
ship; especially since our author allows that man themselves may
appoint them, Aad to deny God the power which he alloweth to
human magistrates in such a case is abhorrent to the common sense
of mankind. "'•^ Leland would liken God to an intelligent earthly
ruler, and His laws to the laws on an intelligent British consti-
tution. To Tindal's assertion that rewards and punishments ac-
company good and bad acts respectively, according to natural law,
Leland pathetically objected in words similar to the following:
"I don't see that it leaves God anything to do in the matter at ;
all, for surely if an earthly king may confer rewards and punish-
ments, God may and ought to do it as well."
As we read over these arguments we become more and more
impressed with the lack of life and death conviction. They seem
to be a mere battle of words, in which the factors God and religion,
conduct and morality, are thrown about and made to answer the
whims of each individual user of them. Par different is the last
critic whom we shall consider, William Law, a sincere man, a
clear and logical thinker. He presents his arguments which strike
at the heart of the q.uestion. The paramount issue in the whole
controversy so far has been. Can reason give us a knowledge of ,
God and his ways? Tindal had answered in the affirmative, because.
IS. Leland, View of Deistical Writers. London, 1754, pp. 154-6.

says he, "God whose infinite wisdom sets him above being deceived
or influenced by any wrong affections, acts in constant conformity
to the reason and fitness of things."* Hence if we observe this
"reason or fitness of things" we shall be acting according to the
ways of God. This reasoning William Law strongly rebukes. For is
not Tindal thereby placing higher and above God a certain "reason
of things" which even God must obey as well as man? Is not this
"reason of things" an entity independent of God? It seems so.
But Law does not stop here. He conclusively demonstrates that
"the rule by which He (God) acts must in many instances be en-
tirely inconceivable by us, so as not to be known at all, and in
no instances fully known or entirely comprehended." Yet Tindal
had firmly asserted that we know ^ust exactly how God acts, namely,
according to the "fitness of things." ;
And, pray, what is this "fitness of things?" Our own
position, our own experiences in this world are entirely inexpli-
cable thru the "reason of things." Reason does not explain the
many instances of the unfitness of things in this world. And
here Law touched upon a vital point, for the deist is too eager
to shut his eyes upon the "misfits" that we find in nature and
society, and to say blindly, "Whatever is is right." The fatality
of such an attitude, the fact that if we rely upon reason alone
we shall have the problem of evil on our hands. Law clearly points
out in the follov/ing passage: "For if everything is arbitrary,
whose fitness and expedience human reason cannot prove and ex-
plain, then surely an invisible over-ruling providence, that
orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to
itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what
*See note 4, page 5.
/
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changes it pleases; that confounds the best laid designs, and
makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives
the race not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that
brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous;
surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.
"And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads
directly to atheism, and brings us under a greater necessity of
rejecting this notion of divine providence, on the accoimt of its
mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in
any of its doctrines. And if, as this writer frequently argues,
G-od cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he
rec^uires anything of us, that our reason cannot prove to be neces-
sary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational and
moral agents, if he overrules our persons and affairs, and dis-
appoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom un-
successful, in a secret and invisible manner, and for reasons and
ends that v/e have no means of knov/ing. " ^^
Law, then, refuses to shut his eyes to the many "misfits"
in this world. Reason does not explain the many discords in our
experiences. Then why complain of the mysteries and shortcomings
of revelation? We have reason, it is true, but reason can be
only the recipient of instruction; it is the faculty that enables
us to receive revelation and profit by it; but never can reason
take the place of revelation - this is his firm conclusion.
In carefully reading over the criticism of Tindal and of
natural religion we cannot fail to be impressed by certain weak-
14. Works of Rev. Wm. Law. London, 1892. Vol. II, page 104.
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nesses common to all of the critics. In their extreme anxiety to
justify the v/ays of God to man they make of the deity a being
15
with human desires, passions, qualities, and attributes. Again,
in defending revelation, all of them, and Foster in particular,
fall into circular reasoning; they use Scripture to prove Scrip-
ture. Another piece of questionahle reasoning which appears many
times - William Law gives it in the most clear-cut form - is the
following: Since reason is just as full of loop-holes and myster-
ies as revelation, we had "better keep revelation. The conclusion,
it is seen, does not follow necessarily from the premises given.
Finally, the most serious flaw and the most extreme in-
stance of shallowness which is clearly evident in all the criti-
cism is the treatment of the problem of evil. In agreement with
their opponent, Tindal, the critics calmly assume that "imatever
is is right." Even Law agreed to this, although he confessed
that reason does not show it. They dismissed all obvious discords
and misfits by asserting that they are really not evils but dis-
guised blessings. God's revelation, for instance, may seem to
bespeak partiality, arbitrariness, and even cruelty; but had we
God's wisdom we would see that in all respects his acts are right .
16. Butler, another of Tindal *s critics, is also caught in this
sin. His analogy between the teachings of revelation and
the actual phenomena of nature seems to justify the ways of
man to God, rather than the ways of God to man.

Chapter IV
Absolutism - The Pxmdamental Error.
Thus far we have suggested how deism arose; we have dis-
cussed the deistical doctrine as presented in Christianity as Old
As Creation ; and we have considered the replies of some of Tindal's
critics. And at the end of this review we are left with a feel-
ing of dissatisfaction, m&t is said both for and against deism
fails to stir us* This is due, the writer believes, to the fact
that Tindal built his doctrine on a false foundation, which his
critics, despite their use of many words, failed to uncover and
destroy.
In the very beginning of his book Tindal vigorously pro-
pounds the iron-clad syllogism, "God has always been the same,
human nature has always been the same, the relations of man to
God have always been the same, hence religion has alv/ays been the
same."^^ This is to say that religion, from creation's dawn, has
been a ready-made article. No one of his critics replied, "Not
80, religion has evolved." That this reply should have been made
the writer will try to make clear in this chapter.
In this syllogism, it is seen, Tindal asserts that "human
nature has always been the same." Now, human nature, as Tindal
used the term, includes both the instinctive desires of man and
reason, whose function is the discovery and application of the
16. Christianity As Old As Creation, page 20.
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right mode of control of these instinctive promptings. Reason,
in other words, is as certainly a part of the natural endowment
of man as hunger and thirst are. Having this understanding of
Tiuman nature" let us proceed*
In one sense of the term "human nature," it is true that
it has always been the same. Human "beings have always wanted to
eat, they have always sought mates, and they have always bowed
down, either in fear or in admiration, to some object or objects
of the universe. Moreover, human nature has always displayed, to
some extent, the ability to reason; it has always brought some
kind of order out of the chaos of its desires. But there is an-
other side to the story. For example, a young woman in Tibet ap-
proves of having several husbands at one time, while it is custom-
ary for an American woman to approve of having one only. Again,
the African Bushman pays his respects to a hideous, vengeful deity,
while an Emerson worships the "Over-Soul." Human nature, then,
with respect to the specific objects to which it inclines, is
not the same in all of its appearances. It seems to vary relative
to the environment in which it plays its role*
The numerous external forces which act upon man's bodily
organism help us to understand the differences in "human nature"
displayed by the Tibetan girl and the American girl, by the
African Bushman and an Emerson. A few simple illustrations will
serve to explain what the writer means by external forces. V/hen
a young woman in Tibet decides to marry she usually gives some
thought to the matter. She understands that her husband will
have to be far from home the greater part of the year, attending
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to the flooks. She shudders at the thought of being left alone
for six or eight months with no one to protect her in her home*
What does she do? Why, the most natural thing for her to do; she
marries several men so that she may "be able to keep one with her
all the time. Horrible, you say? Certainly not, it is very
reasonable. It is all the result of the peculiar geographic con-
ditions in Tibet, which make it necessary for the flocks to wander
over a large area in order to find sufficient food.
The technic influences are nearly as important as are the
geographic. Let us watch a child grow up in Hottentot society.
He plays with the other children in the camp. He learns the calls
of the birds and the cries of the animals, he learns to hunt and
to make stone implements, he learns to respect the elders and
slavishly to follow the traditions of his group. But he cannot
learn about other boys in other tribes, far distant from his
own. He cannot learn their games, their mode of hunting, and
their traditions. And as he grows older he develops a type of
mind that is conservative and narrow; he has regard only for his
own immediate group. He will share equally with his tribal
brother, but let a stranger appear and he will grab for his scalp.
He has no books in which he may read about others, he has no
railroads by vdiich to visit them, he has no telegraph or postal
system by which to communicate with them. His "nature," there-
fore, is not and cannot be the same as that of the child who
is raised in New York, London, or Paris, because he lacks all of
the technic conditions which the development of a more cosmopolitan
spirit requires.
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But this is not all. The Hottentot child is reared in a
society which has to cope with the powerful and apparently caprici-
ous forces of nature. The Hottentot is constantly at the mercy
of the winds, the rains, the storms, droughts, famines, and dis-
eases, concerning the causes of which he loiows nothing. Hence he
ascribes them to a hideously powerful and capricious heing, whom
he endeavors to appease "oj crude cereraonies and rituals. And it
is such a God that the Hottentot child learns to fear and to
worship. But Emerson, on the other hand, was raised in a society
which had succeeded, to a great extent, in understanding and
in harnessing the winds and the tides, famines and diseases. In
Emerson's society the most pressing. problem was how to "harness"
human nature, individual and social conduct, thru justice, wisdom,
and goodness. Hence in his society it was a god that was wise,
good, and just that was reverenced. And it is such a god that
Emerson learned to love and to worship. And as he grev/ up he was
able to change his idea of God still further, and to make it
even more satisfactory to himself, for philosophers and theologians
had lived before him and had prepared the way. Emerson's belief
in the "Over-Soul" was the result of the environment in Miich he
lived. It Y/as the social organization, the higher platie of Imowl-
edge, the wealth of philosophy, science and art of his society
that enabled him to produce his "Over-Soul" and, as Santayana
says, "To awaken in us this spiritual insight, an elevation of
mind which is at once an act of comprehension and of worship, to
substitute it for lov/er passions and more servile forms of in-
telligence. ""^"^
17. Santayana. Interpretations of Poetry and Religion . New York,
1905, page 221.
«
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It is seen, then, that hiunan organisms with their in-
stinctive wants and desires are continually "buoking up" against
a geographic environment, are always meeting a technic accomplish-
ment, and are everywhere surrounded by social conditions and re-
quirements. All of these influences change very much the "nature"
of the human being. And since they are not the same for any two
groups of people, in fact not wholly the same for any two indi-
viduals, the morals, customs, and religions of any two groups will
differ. The morality of the fifteenth century Englishman was
nothing like that of the present twentieth century Englishman.
The whole feudal system with its serfs and villeins is an institu-
tion absolutely immoral from the modern point of view. Slavery,
up to a short time ago, was a very necessary and morally approved
institution among civilized people. But what do we think of
slavery today? There is no activity under the sun that has not
been both right and wrong at different times and under different
conditions. Every institution has in its time been the expression
of "human nature." It was "human nature" for the Greeks to en-
slave their captives in order that they themselves might en^oy
leisure and comfort. It is surely "human nature" also to declare
freedom and liberty to every hiunan being whatever may be his creed
or color. We find that it is the expression of "human nature"
for some people to kill their aged, as certain tribes among the
Esquimos do; yet we say that the right kind of "human nature"
leads one to respect, love, and protect the aged. We are forced
to conclude, then, that "human nature" would both protect and
kill, enslave and declare free. And it is only thru taking into
consideration the external forces acting upon man that these
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seeming contradictions are answered.
But if "human nature" in its deliverances shows so much
variety not only must Tindal's statement that "human nature has
always heen the same" be declared false, "but also another of his
premises, namely, that God does not change. For Tindal has as-
sured us that God is the cause of our instincts and of the reason
which guides them, and also that He is the father whose perfections
will not allow Him to deceive His children. Hence, instead of
being changeless Ha must constantly be taking on a new character
and prescribing new laws. Eov/ else could He keep up with the
changing conception of Himself and the laws which He is furnishing
His children?
Uor is it for Tindal alone that this premise becomes un-
tenable. fJhoever maintains that God and the moral laws are known
only thru the natural faculty, reason, must give up the notion
of a never-changing God and absolute moral laws. For reason, it
has been shown, reveals a changing God and a changing morality.
And those who advocate the use of reason in relation to God and
morality and at the same time insist that God and morality are
changeless, are contradicting themselves, for they are claiming
to know that which they do not know. The God and the moral laws
which reason discloses, let us repeat, display endless variations.
In conclusion, then, we may ask. Is Christianity As Old
as Creation? We must answer that it is not, and that no doctrine
is. Beliefs, like everything else with which we are acquainted,
belong to a process of evolution. Tindal and his contemporaries
had not learned the historical method; and as a result they were
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convinced all too easily that doctrines to which the eignteenth
century gave birth expressed eternal truth.
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